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Financial globalization opened international capital markets to investors and firms all over the world.  Foreign 
capital raisings by firms have increased substantially since the early 1990s in terms of equity as well as debt.  I 
review the literature on the determinants and patterns of cross-border capital raisings and their effects on 
developments of domestic markets, highlighting the differences between mature and emerging economies.  I focus 
on the effects the introduction of the euro had on European and global capital markets by bringing into existence a 
currency area comparable in size to that of the United States.  Finally, I discuss the effects of financial crises on 
foreign capital raisings and review capital raisings during the 2007-09 global financial crisis. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
The first decade of the century witnessed a rare rise and fall in capital markets, both international and domestic, in 
developed and developing countries alike.  To be sure, it is not the first time international capital markets have 
experienced such booms and busts – two remarkable episodes in the 20
th century were lending boom decades 
preceding the Great Depression and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the mid-1970s.   The recent 
episode started in the early 1990s and continued through 2007 with a few interruptions by financial crises that were 
mostly limited to developing countries. It was characterized by the low and declining cost of capital accompanied by 
rapid increase in equity and debt issues both in domestic and international markets, especially from 2001 to 2007.  
With debt growing at a faster pace than equity, this also implied an increase in leverage all over the world. 
The low cost of capital and an increase in capital raisings were especially prominent, relatively speaking, for 
developing countries because of a rapid pace of financial liberalization in emerging markets of Latin America, East 
Asia, and Eastern Europe. The introduction of the euro in 1999, in addition, contributed to internalization of 
developed countries’ capital markets. Between 1991 and 2005, 28 percent of developing countries’ equity and 47 
percent of their debt securities were issued abroad.  For the same period, 8 percent of developed countries’ equity 
and 35 percent of their debt securities were issued abroad (Gozzi et al., 2010).  Figure 1 shows the dynamics of 
domestic and foreign debt and equity capital raisings by private firms in developed and developing countries. This 
capital raising boom ended when financial crisis broke out in August 2007 and worsened after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 
Studying the patterns of capital raisings during the latest boom and bust can provide us with insights into the 
benefits and dangers of rapid expansion in cross-border equity and debt holdings. Crises always provide 
opportunities for lessons to be learned, and the 2007-09 financial crisis was no exception.  Thus, in this paper I will 
review the data and the literature on the patterns and determinants of capital raisings by developing and developed 
countries on domestic and foreign markets and then will turn to a discussion of the effects of the financial crises.  
Unlike in many previous episodes, private capital raisings were much more important than sovereign borrowing 
during the latest boom and bust, at least prior to the sovereign debt problems induced by fiscal responses to the 
crisis.  Therefore, in this paper I will focus on capital raisings by private firms.   
In focusing on this demand-side part of the capital market, I will not spend much time on the supply side – 
investors’ decisions to invest in or lend to firms in foreign countries.  It is worth mentioning, however, that even as 
of 2007, when the level of financial globalization was at its highest in the recent past, we still observed a substantial 
degree of home bias in investment.  Theory predicts that investors should diversify their country-specific risks by 
investing in foreign assets.  Even taking into account the need for hedging ones’ country-specific risks, differences 
in information, and the like, the evidence suggests that cross-border holdings of financial assets, while much higher 
than they were in the past, are still substantially lower than theory would predict.  This suggests that there is still a 
potential for further increases in cross-border asset holdings and that both demand and supply factors may account 
for home bias in investment.   
In this paper I will discuss the demand factors – the reasons firms may want to access foreign, as opposed to 
domestic, capital markets and which firms find it profitable to do so.  I will also analyze the implications of these 
decisions for domestic capital markets and vulnerability to international financial contagion. Because the levels of 
financial development differ greatly between developed and developing countries, the set of issues they face in 
raising international capital is also different, and therefore the literature usually considers them separately (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2008).  Moreover, competition with foreign capital markets has different implications for strong, 
mature financial markets of developed countries than for young, fragile markets of emerging economies.  Thus, I 
will discuss developed and developing countries separately. 4 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews capital raisings by developed countries, Section III focuses on 
emerging markets, and Section IV discusses the effects of crises on both developed and developing countries and on 
international capital markets in general.  Section V concludes. 
 
II.  Developed world: patterns and effects of cross-border capital raisings 
Financial markets in the developed world are well established.  This has two main conflicting implications on the 
trade-off between domestic and foreign capital raisings.  On the one hand, domestic infrastructure and the depth of 
capital markets are usually adequate to allow most firms to borrow and issue equity domestically, thus avoiding the 
additional costs associated with tapping foreign capital markets.  On the other hand, mature financial markets are 
more integrated with each other and therefore additional costs of accessing foreign capital markets are not so large.  
Below I discuss in detail specific costs and benefits of issuing equity and debt securities abroad versus in domestic 
markets. 
Financial globalization and internationalization of financial firms have blurred the line between domestic and 
international capital markets – investors from countries that are open to international capital flows can access 
securities traded in foreign countries.  Hence, stocks and bonds issued by firms domestically may be purchased by 
foreign investors either directly or through financial intermediaries. For the purpose of this article I will define 
domestic equity issuance as issuance on domestic, as opposed to foreign, stock exchanges.  Because bond trading 
takes place over the counter, I will define domestic bond issuance as bonds denominated in domestic currency, as 
opposed to bonds issued in foreign currency.  For most countries this definition would also correspond to bonds 
placed on domestic, as opposed to international, markets.  I will define bank lending as international, or cross-
border, if the borrower and the branch administering a loan are located in different countries, regardless of the 
currency denomination of the loan. 
 
a.  Portfolio equity issuance 
 
Why would firms in developed countries with mature capital markets seek to place equity on foreign exchanges?  
There are a number of reasons. Issuing equity abroad allows firms to tap a larger pool of investors and raise more 
capital through the equity market, as well as enjoy more active trading in shares and therefore more efficient pricing.  
Listing in the foreign capital markets is also likely to disseminate information about the firm to a larger group of 
investors – through their equity prices, required publications, and analysts’ reports – making it easier for these firms 
to also raise debt in the foreign markets should they choose to do so.  Furthermore, if a firm is interested in forming 
international business relations, for exporting or importing purposes for example, the information dissemination may 
also prove useful.  Finally, foreign issuance may serve as a “seal of approval,” signaling to investors that the firm is 
creditworthy and has high growth potential. 
There are costs of issuing equity overseas as well.  To begin with, there is a fixed cost of acquiring necessary 
institutional knowledge or seeking assistance from a financial company that would facilitate foreign equity issuance.  
In addition, regulations and disclosure requirements vary across countries, and therefore a firm that is issuing equity 
abroad, as well as on domestic markets, will have to comply with more than one regulatory standard.  Therefore 
only firms that gain a lot from foreign equity issuance will choose to do so.  
What firms tend to raise capital abroad?  As one would expect, firms that raise capital abroad are those that need 
access to a larger pool of investors – they tend to be larger and more indebted, have higher capital expenditures, and 
have better growth potential.  These firms also tend to issue in domestic markets even after they access international 5 
 
capital markets.  Interestingly, issuing equity abroad has the same impact on a firm’s performance as issuing equity 
domestically (Gozzi et al., 2010). 
The question remains, however, whether issuing equity on the foreign exchange does indeed encourage foreign 
investors to buy a higher stake in a firm.  Given that most developed world capital markets are quite open, one 
would expect international investors interested in a particular firm to be able to buy shares at their domestic 
exchange.  Nevertheless, there is robust evidence that, other things being equal, foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S. 
receive more than three times as much U.S. investment as firms that are not cross-listed in the U.S.  This large 
difference can be explained by limited cross-border information flows and differences in disclosure standards across 
countries.   
The most rapid growth of foreign equity issuance by firms from developed countries occurred in the beginning of 
the century: Between 2000 and 2005, portfolio equity issuance abroad by developed countries’ firms increased from 
6.8 to 8.6 percent of total issuance.  As of 2008, about 15 percent of foreign equity issued by firms in developed 
countries was placed on the U.S. stock exchanges, while 9 percent was placed in London, 7 percent in Tokyo, and 
44 percent in European exchanges.  The large number for European exchanges is partly explained by equity issuance 
by firms from other European countries. 
 
Given that most developed economies have mature financial markets and active stock trading, it is unlikely that they 
can be harmed by competition with global equity markets, especially given that firms continue to issue equity 
domestically after they tap foreign equity markets.  On the contrary, globalization of equity markets improves 
information flows across countries and is likely to make both domestic and international markets more efficient.  On 
the other hand, globalized capital markets are more interconnected and therefore are likely to increase countries’ 
vulnerability to shocks originating in the foreign financial markets.  For example, if a company is cross-listed on 
more than one stock exchange, a decline of its stock price on one stock exchange, which may be due to factors not 
directly related to the firms’ performance, may trigger a decline in the price of its stock on the other exchange.  The 
more companies are cross-listed, the more correlated the stock prices across stock returns will be.   
 
b.  Bond issuance 
 
Many of the reasons described above that make it beneficial for firms to issue equity abroad also apply to foreign 
issuance of debt securities. In addition, there are considerations related to transaction costs and currency exposure of 
liabilities.  Issuing debt in foreign currency in foreign markets not only gives issuing firms access to a wider pool of 
lenders and allows them to disseminate information about their creditworthiness, but also provides them with an 
opportunity to hedge their long-term foreign currency exposure.  For example, a firm that receives a large share of 
its revenue from foreign sales invoiced in U.S. dollars will benefit from issuing a portion of its debt in U.S. dollars 
as well.  This implies, of course, that an increase in international trade, as we observed in the period between 1990 
and 2007, is likely to be one of the reasons for an increase in international bond issuance.   By some estimates, 
between 1995 and 2005 bond issuance abroad by developed countries’ firms increased from 27 to 46 percent of total 
bond issuance. 
The global bond market is dominated by just a few currencies – the U.S. dollar, the euro, the pound, and the yen.  
There is substantial evidence that transaction costs of bond issuance decline with market size, providing borrowers 
from countries other than the U.S., U.K., euro area, and Japan with an additional incentive to issue in foreign 
currency – a reduction in transaction costs.  This cost reduction needs to be weighed against potential mismatch in 
the currency composition of a firm’s balance sheet – if a firm issues bonds in foreign currency but its assets and 
revenues are primarily denominated in domestic currency, this firm’s balance sheet is exposed to exchange rate 
fluctuations.  Given that the median maturity of international bond issues is around five years, such exchange rate 6 
 
exposure is not possible to hedge through forward currency markets. This problem, however, is more acute for 
developing countries, as I will discuss below. 
The patterns of international bond issuance are consistent with the above reasons for firms to access foreign bond 
markets – foreign bonds are issued predominantly in the currencies of major financial centers.  Between 1990 and 
2008, 65 percent of bonds issued by firms from developed countries other than the U.S. were denominated in U.S. 
dollars, 6 percent of bonds issued by firms from developed countries outside the U.K. were denominated in pounds, 
and 7 percent of bonds issued by firms from developed countries outside Japan were denominated in yen.  
Much like with equity, firms that benefit from foreign bond issuance are larger, have better growth potential, and 
have larger capital expenditures.  They also tend to continue issuing debt domestically even after they access foreign 
bond markets.  In addition, there is evidence that issuers are sensitive to the changes in the interest rate differentials 
– for example, when the U.K. interest rate rises relative to that in the U.S., issuance of bonds denominated in pounds 
tends to decline (Gozzi et al., 2010). 
Given that the transaction costs of issuing decline with the size of the market, it is natural to expect that markets for 
bonds denominated in major currencies will keep dominating global bond markets.  While bond issuance in 
domestic currencies will continue to exist for most countries, it is unlikely to expand.  The advent of the euro, as 
discussed below, created an important alternative to the U.S. dollar-denominated bond market, affecting the 
currency denomination of bonds issued by all countries, not only those in the euro area. 
 
c.  Bank loans 
 
Bank loans are different from equity and debt issues in that the information about the borrower remains in the 
private domain of the lender and is not disseminated to other potential investors.  Therefore many of the motives for 
foreign equity and debt issuance discussed above are not applicable to international bank lending.  Most large-scale 
lending takes the form of syndicated bank loans, and many of the syndicates consist of a number of multinational 
banks or include banks from different countries, thus creating a substantial amount of international bank flows.  The 
main reason firms access foreign bank capital is that the size of the required loan may be too large for an individual 
domestic bank, or even a syndicate of domestic banks to shoulder. 
 
There are two main ways for private firms to access foreign bank capital – directly and through domestic banks that 
themselves borrow from foreign banks.   As of the end of 2008, 49 percent of international bank loans to developed 
country borrowers were extended to banks, while 38 percent were extended directly to nonbank private firms (the 
remaining 13 percent of loans were extended to sovereign or quasi-sovereign borrowers).   These numbers do not 
include internal lending within multinational banking corporations, when cross-border lending takes the form of 
within-institution transfers between branches of the same bank. 
 
While the United States and U.S. dollar markets lead in terms of equity and portfolio debt issuance, continental 
Europe (predominantly France and Germany) and the U.K. are leaders in terms of cross-border bank lending. As of 
March 2010 European banks held 63 percent of cross-border loans to borrowers in developed countries, of which 11 
percent were U.K. banks, while U.S. and Japanese banks held 8 and 7 percent, respectively.   
 
International bank lending, especially bank-to-bank international lending, is important in terms of creating links for 
cross-border information flows and bank relationships.  These relationships between banks, in turn, facilitate 
international securities issuance, especially in the case of debt securities – there is evidence that developed countries 
in which banks are more connected to global banking networks tend to hold larger positions in debt securities, both 
on the assets and on the liabilities side.  At the same time, interconnectedness of banking systems across countries 7 
 
allow for the spillovers of liquidity shocks and produce cross-border correlations in bank asset performance such as 




d.  Effects of the EMU 
 
Prior to the financial crisis, probably the single most important event for the developed countries’ international 
capital markets was the introduction of the euro in 1999.  Sufficient time has passed since then, which allows us to 
evaluate the effects of this event.  As intended, the introduction of the single currency substantially reduced 
transaction costs for capital flows between euro area countries. This was partly due to the introduction of TARGET 
– a new EU-wide payment system, partly due to the harmonization of the set of rules, but mostly due to the 
elimination of the currency risk and the need to hedge it as well as to common monetary policy (Kalemli-Ozcan et 
al., 2010).  Some evidence suggests that differences in equity markets within the euro area were reduced by the 
introduction of the euro, while the correlation of stock prices across these markets increased (Syllignakis, 2006).  
 
In addition, the introduction of the euro combined a number of separate bond markets (a market defined as bonds 
denominated in a given currency) into one, far exceeding the size of the largest pre-European Monetary Union 
market, that is, a market for Deutsche mark-denominated bonds.  This had two effects on international bond 
issuance: first, it further reduced transaction costs within the euro area for cross-border investments in corporate 
portfolio debt; second, it created a market for bonds denominated in a stable currency comparable in size to that of 
the market for bonds denominated in the U.S. dollar (Coeurdacier and Martin, 2009).  This, in turn, increased the 
probability that the borrowers in the U.S., Europe, and the rest of the world would issue new bonds in euros as 
opposed to the U.S. dollar.   Hale and Spiegel (2009) show that the probability that an average borrower would issue 
a bond denominated in euros was 35 percentage points higher, on average, in the decade following the introduction 
of the euro than the probability of issuing in one of the legacy currencies, on average, in the decade prior to the 
introduction of the euro.  Importantly, this effect is not driven by European firms only – firms in the U.S., U.K, and 
the rest of the world were all more likely to denominate their foreign bonds in euros than they were to denominate 
them in one of the euro area currencies prior to the advent of the euro. 
 
Overall, there is growing evidence that the euro area capital markets are quickly becoming a single market.  
Investors in Europe are increasingly exhibiting a euro-bias as opposed to home-bias, viewing all of the euro area 
assets, especially those issued in larger euro area countries as their own (Giofré, 2008; Ferreira and Ferreira, 2006).  
Investors outside the euro area increasingly see one euro area market as opposed to a collection of related but 
separate markets.  This is also true in case of bank lending – cross-border bank lending between the countries within 
the euro area increased substantially after the introduction of the euro, more so than into and out of the euro area 
(Spiegel, 2009a and 2009b).  
 
 
III.  Emerging markets 
 
Almost by definition, emerging markets are those with young and undeveloped financial markets and relatively 
scarce domestic capital.  Therefore the main reason firms in emerging markets raise capital abroad is to access 
foreign capital provided by rich countries’ investors.  The main reason foreign investors are interested in holding 
assets of firms in emerging markets is the historically high return on these assets. Despite this high return, the 
volume of capital flows from rich countries to emerging markets is still well below what theory would predict, due, 
predominantly, to institutional constraints and the inherent political risks of investing in emerging markets. 
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Foreign capital raisings by emerging market firms are a relatively new phenomenon;  for most of the period after 
World War II the majority of developing countries restricted their residents’ access to foreign capital markets, both 
in terms of borrowing and in terms of investing.  Financial liberalization among the emerging markets, including the 
liberalization of cross-border capital flows, was led by Latin America after the debt crisis of the 1980s and by 
emerging Asia starting in the mid-1990s.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, Eastern 
European markets and the countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union quickly joined the group of rapidly 
developing and reforming financial markets and also opened their borders to international capital flows. 
 
The development of local financial systems and liberalization of international capital flows in the emerging markets 
was far from being smooth. Since the early 1990s, a number of financial crises rocked these economies – the 
Mexican crisis of 1994, the East Asian crisis of 1997-98, followed by the Russia-LTCM crisis of 1998 and Brazil’s 
sovereign default in 1999.  Argentina’s default and collapse of the currency board in 2001, while dramatic for 
Argentina’s economy, was more localized.  In each of these cases, economies affected by the crises experienced 
major downturns, leading to a debate in the literature on the costs and benefits of liberalization of international 
capital flows, the debate that still continues in the aftermath of 2007-09 global financial crisis.  While this debate on 
the usefulness and effectiveness of capital controls is beyond the scope of this paper, I will discuss below the 
evidence on the effect the said financial crises had on capital raisings by emerging market firms.  It is too soon to tell 




a.  Domestic equity market development and foreign equity issuance 
 
For large firms in emerging markets foreign issuance of equity is more of a necessity than a choice, given that in 
many of them domestic stock markets are shallow and underdeveloped.  Most prominent recent examples are initial 
public offerings of the partially privatized large Chinese banks. These banks did issue some equity on the domestic 
stock exchange in Shanghai, but given the sheer value of the IPOs, the largest in history, they had to list on Hong 
Kong stock exchange and in some cases in New York as well.  Beyond this need for market depth, the same 
motivation as discussed in the case of developed countries applies to emerging market firms. Firms in developing 
countries largely issued equity in the U.S. markets, mainly through American Drawing Rights (ADRs). As of 2008, 
about 14 percent of foreign equity issued by firms in emerging markets were issued in the U.S., with the rest issued 
in the U.K., Europe, China, and through offshore financial centers. 
 
There is debate in the literature about the effect foreign equity raisings may have on the development of domestic 
equity markets, and the evidence so far has been mixed.  On the one hand, firms that cross-list on foreign stock 
exchanges or issue ADRs are likely to show an example of international disclosure standards and also provide a 
good base for domestic stock markets, since they are likely to issue domestically as well.  Moreover, some literature 
conjectures that competition with foreign equity markets may induce policymakers to speed up the reform that 
would remove the barriers faced by domestic equity markets.  On the other hand, the fact that large amounts of 
equity are raised on the foreign, rather than domestic, markets may hamper the development of domestic markets by 
never letting them get deep enough – in one equilibrium, large firms issue domestically and domestic markets 
develop, while in another equilibrium, all large firms choose to issue equity abroad and domestic markets never 
reach the trading volume that would allow them to attract large domestic issuers (Levine and Schmukler, 2006).   
 
 
b.  Private bond issuance 
 
Foreign capital markets are especially important for developing countries’ bond issuance.  Almost half of the debt 
issued by emerging markets is issued abroad.  From the point of view of efficiency, it may be optimal, especially for 9 
 
smaller countries, to encourage their firms to tap foreign bond markets instead of developing their own, because 
transaction costs on the small markets may be large and there may not be sufficient trading to maintain liquidity of 
the secondary bond market.  This would result in a high cost of issuance, especially because it is hard for emerging 
markets to attract foreign capital to their local currency markets (Burger and Warnock, 2007).  Since smaller 
countries also tend to be more engaged in international trade, issuing bonds in foreign currency may not lead to 
currency mismatch on firms’ balance sheets.  It may, in fact, provide a hedge from currency risk exposure for firms 
that are exporting and pricing their foreign sales in the currency of the market they sell in or in U.S. dollars, the main 
trade invoicing currency.   
 
Domestic bond markets are especially underdeveloped in emerging Asia.  In recognition of the importance of 
economies of scale, the Asian Bond Market Initiative by ASEAN+3 countries aims at developing a regional bond 
market, taking emphasis away from developing individual countries’ bond markets.  An additional difficulty for 
Asian emerging markets arises from the fact that they don’t have a long history of foreign sovereign bond issuance 
that could facilitate private firms’ access to global bond markets by providing benchmark pricing of sovereign bonds 
and sovereign credit ratings.  Arguably, firms from emerging markets of Latin America and Eastern Europe 
benefited from the benchmark assessment of the country-specific risk of the bonds due to active secondary markets 
in their sovereign bonds.  However, too much sovereign debt may make investors unwilling to increase their 
exposure to a given country’s risk and thus may crowd out private debt that is subject to firm-specific risk in 
addition to the country risk. 
 
From the firm’s point of view, issuing a bond in a foreign market allows it to tap deeper markets, pay lower 
transaction costs and liquidity premia, disseminate information, and receive a credit rating.  On the other hand, 
issuance of foreign currency-denominated bonds tends to lead to a currency mismatch on the balance sheet of the 
firms.  As was most prominently shown by the collapse of the Argentinean currency in 2001, the balance sheet 
effects in this case can be very large – when the peso lost more than half of its value vis-à-vis the dollar, firms that 
were solvent otherwise became effectively bankrupt, since their dollar-denominated liabilities more than doubled 
while their peso-denominated assets remained unchanged.  This balance sheet effect is further propagated by the 
affected firm’s inability to continue borrowing because of the deterioration of its balance sheet and relative decline 
in the value of its collateral, which is also likely to be denominated in domestic currency. 
 
Emerging market firms tend to denominate their bonds either in U.S. dollars or in the currency of the closest 
financial center.  Between 1990 and 2008, 95 percent of foreign bonds issued by Latin American firms were 
denominated in U.S. dollars, 90 percent of foreign bonds issued by emerging markets in Eastern Europe were 
denominated in U.S. dollars and 9 percent in Deutsch mark or the euro, 92 percent of foreign bonds issued by 
emerging markets of East Asia were denominated in U.S. dollars, while 3 percent were denominated in yen.  As 
developing countries’ domestic capital markets develop, we should expect larger countries with stable currencies to 
develop their own currency bond markets that may become target bond markets for the firms in the region’s smaller 
countries.   
 
 
c.  Bank loans 
 
For large companies in emerging markets, borrowing from foreign banks or bank syndicates is more a necessity than 
a choice – domestic financial markets and banks are frequently not sufficiently large to provide them with loans of 
the required size. Since domestic banking systems are less developed in the emerging markets and their banks are 
less interconnected with the global banking system, it is more common for nonfinancial private firms to access 
foreign bank capital directly, rather than through the intermediation of their domestic banks.  This is especially true 
for the borrowers from Eastern Europe and Latin America, where almost 70 percent of international bank loans go 
directly to nonbank private firms and only about 20 percent of international loans are extended to banks.  For East 10 
 
Asia, where the banking system is substantially stronger, 53 percent of the international bank loans are extended 
directly to nonbank private firms, while 37 percent are extended to banks. 
 
European banks dominate lending to emerging market borrowers, as they do in the case of developed country 
borrowers. In addition to French, German, and U.K. banks, Spanish banks are actively engaged in lending to 
emerging market borrowers, mostly those in Latin America.  Geographical proximity, however, plays an even more 
important role for international bank lending than it does for the issuance of debt securities.  For borrowers from 
emerging East Asia, 54 percent of the loans are extended by European banks (including the U.K.), 14 percent by 
U.S. banks, and 12 percent by Japanese banks.  For borrowers from Eastern Europe, European banks and the U.K. 
extend 92 percent of the loans, while American and Japanese banks extend only 3 and 2 percent, respectively.  Latin 
American borrowers owe 64 percent of their cross-border bank loans to European banks (a majority of these loans 
come from Spanish banks), while they owe 16 percent of their loans to U.S. banks and 6 percent to Japanese banks.   
 
Relationships that emerging market banks establish with global or foreign banks by borrowing from them and by 
participating in international bank lending syndicates are important for the growth of cross-border flows of other 
assets and liabilities.  While for the developed countries bank relationships seem to only affect debt flows, there is 
evidence that emerging market countries in which banks are more closely linked to the global banking network tend 
to have larger positions in terms of equity as well as debt securities, on both the assets and the liabilities side.  This 
is not surprising – because emerging markets have less variety of financial intermediaries, banks are more likely to 
play an active role in intermediating equity flows and transmitting relevant information in emerging markets than in 
the developed world. 
 
  
d.  Effects of financial crises 
 
Developing countries’ access to global capital markets did not improve monotonically since the early 1990s.  It was 
interrupted on many occasions by emerging market financial crises that were mostly regional.  These financial crises 
consisted of various combinations of widespread crises of domestic banking systems, currency collapses, and 
defaults on sovereign debt.  In each of the cases domestic capital markets were severely impaired by the crises 
themselves and because of the recessions that followed and, crucially, balance sheet effects that rendered many 
banks and nonfinancial firms technically insolvent overnight.   Thus, while demand for external financing of any 
kind tends to fall during recessions because of economic uncertainty, decline in the demand for foreign capital in the 
aftermath of emerging market crises was limited by the fact that domestic capital was scarce. 
The estimated size of a decline in foreign credit to emerging market private firms is about 25 percent in the first year 
following large currency depreciations (Hale and Arteta, 2009). This decline is especially large in the first five 
months, is less pronounced in the second year, and disappears entirely by the third year (see top panel of Figure 2). 
Only about a quarter of the initial decline in credit could be attributed to the “credit crunch,” while the rest of the 
decline is due to contracting demand – in the first six months after the currency collapse, demand for foreign funds 
is estimated to fall by around 35 percent. After six months, however, most of the credit decline could be attributed to 
supply effects, which could be partly explained by the balance sheet effects, described above, that instantly reduce 
creditworthiness and the value of collateral of the firms that had currency mismatch on their balance sheets. 
There is also evidence that the effects are exacerbated in cases when financial crises are accompanied by sovereign 
defaults (Arteta and Hale, 2008).  Controlling for the effects of currency collapses and a country’s overall 
macroeconomic well-being, one finds that credit tends to decline by over 20 percent during the debt renegotiations 
and for more than two years after the restructuring agreement is reached (see bottom panel of Figure 2). The size of 
contraction in foreign credit to the private sector depends on the type of debt restructuring: it is smaller after 
agreements with commercial creditors as opposed to agreements with official creditors, and no contraction occurs 11 
 
after voluntary debt swaps and debt buybacks; furthermore, agreements that include new lending lead to a lower 
decline in foreign credit to private firms than agreements that do not include new lending.  This pattern is consistent 
with the effects different types of sovereign debt restructuring may have on investors’ perceptions of the 
implications for the country-specific risk that spills over to their assessment of the risk of corporate debt of the 
affected country’s firms.  Recent analysis by Ağca and Celasun (2010) also shows that country credit risk associated 
with high sovereign foreign debt is likely to have a negative impact on private firms’ ability to raise capital on 
foreign debt markets. 
Some of the emerging market crises were also accompanied by widespread crises of domestic banking systems, 
although in many cases the causality between balance-of-payments problems and banking crises are hard to establish 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).  In some cases banks were rescued, while in others they were allowed to fail or be 
taken over by foreign or larger domestic banks.  Importantly, relationships between banks were broken in these 
cases, which further contributed to the decline in domestically available funds for firms through loss of valuable 
private information about the borrowers.  Evidence suggests that it takes about a year after a systemic banking crisis 
for bank relationships to be restored and that the breakdown in bank relationships has a sizeable effect on domestic 
bank lending in the year that follows. 
 
 
IV.  Capital raisings during the 2007-09 global financial crisis 
 
While more integrated financial markets experienced the impact of the crisis more quickly and more dramatically, it 
is hard to argue that globalization per se was the cause of the 2007-09 financial crisis (Eichengreen, 2010) and that 
the economic impacts of the crisis were related to countries’ exposure to foreign assets and liabilities (Rose and 
Spiegel, 2010). 
The global financial crisis of 2007-09 was initially felt by banks and the interbank market but spread quickly to 
other capital markets through a global freeze of credit and the substantial decline in stock prices worldwide.  
Domestic and foreign capital raisings, beyond working capital financing, basically came to a standstill.  Evidence 
suggests that relationships between banks, which commonly suffer whenever there is a recession in the U.S. or a 
banking crisis in a country in consideration, were destroyed even further.   
It is too soon to tell what the long-term consequences of the crisis will be for domestic and foreign capital raisings 
by developed and developing country firms.  One can tell, however, that even countries with very strong capital 
controls, such as China, which avoided a direct impact from the problems on the U.S. subprime markets, did not 
escape completely.  Their economies were deeply affected by the global recession through reduced demand for their 
exports and global collapse of international trade.  As fundamentals worsened, so did financial positions of the firms 
and therefore the value of their collateral, limiting their borrowing ability. 
Among the countries that were open to international capital flows, those with better creditor protection and with 
banks that are better connected to the global banking network experienced a smaller decline in the values of their 
stock market indexes and therefore did not suffer as much of a setback in terms of firms’ ability to raise capital 
domestically (Hale and Razin, 2009; Caballero et al., 2009).  Further development of global capital markets, as well 
as the future of domestic and foreign capital raisings by private firms, will crucially depend on two factors – the 




Financial globalization brought many benefits to developing and developed countries alike through allowing firms’ 
access to global capital markets and thereby lowering the cost of capital.  As is always the case, however, benefits 
do come with costs.  Financial globalization and cross-border capital raisings created channels for financial 
contagion that were not present otherwise.  Nevertheless, a dominant view among economists remains that 
liberalization of cross-border capital flows is important in the long run even though it increases the vulnerability of 
countries to foreign financial shocks as we observed in 2007-09.   
While financial globalization may lead to severe competition for some of the emerging domestic capital markets and 
may in fact impair their development, it allows firms to reach a large pool of investors and leads to more efficient 
allocation of capital on a global scale.  As the Asian crisis of 1997-98 and the global crisis of 2007-08 highlighted, 
excessive leverage may lead to costly collapses.  Preventing foreign capital raisings, however, is not a solution – 
with more globalized capital markets, financial regulation will hopefully become more harmonized across countries 
and will help prevent excessive leverage in the future. 
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Note: Billion U.S. dollars at 2005 prices. 
Source:  Gozzi et al. (2010) 
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Figure 2.  Effects of financial crises on emerging market firms’ foreign borrowing 
Effect of large currency depreciation  
     




Note: horizontal axis shows months before and after depreciation or debt restructuring; vertical axis shows percent 
deviation from average foreign borrowing by private firms, conditional on macroeconomic development.  F-tests in 
the bottom panel show joint probability that the deviation is zero. 
Source:  Hale and Arteta (2009) for the top panel; Arteta and Hale (2008) for the bottom panel. 